It also spawned that rarest of Hollywood offerings, the Pentagon procurement farce. The contretemps led to wholesale changes in the Bradley and in weapons testing. It led to the storied conflict between the Army and Jim Burton, an Air Force officer serving as a Pentagon weapons tester. For example, curious taxpayers seeking to learn what their billions got for the failed Future Combat Systems will click on what used to be the Army webpage singing its praises and end up on a dead page.īut its original aluminum armor proved insufficient, to put it gently. And we’d be remiss not to note that since the Cold War’s end, the service also has wasted almost $7 billion failing to produce its next-gen RAH-66 Comanche helicopter, and about $2 billion on its Crusader self-propelled howitzer.īut it’s tough to learn from the past when it keeps getting erased. Unlike shiny aircraft and huge warships, Army armor is relatively small potatoes, and doesn’t get the attention it deserves. Aren’t the civilians running the Pentagon supposed to know when they’re being sold a bill of goods, and refuse to go along? Isn’t that supposed to be the best thing about the revolving door that spins the brains of the military-industrial complex between the Pentagon and the defense contractors? So they’ll know when soldiers, never mind taxpayers, are being screwed? But why the rush? By reaching for the stars, the Army keeps crashing and burning.
